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Paul Earlie 
2  Psychoanalysis and the Rhetorical 
Tradition: Theory and Technique
I
For all the richness of his classical culture, Freud has curiously little to say about 
the rhetorical tradition. For some, this ellipsis is simply constitutional. According 
to his faithful biographer Ernest Jones, Freud never really went in for “ oratory” 
when addressing an audience,¹ a view endorsed by his English translator and 
editor James Strachey, for whom “ [Freud’s lecturing style] was never rhetorical 
[…] his tone was always one of quiet and even intimate conversation (SE, XV, 
5–6).² That Freud’s prose is rhetorical and is so in a way that is unusually persua-
sive seems scarcely objectionable today. What is more striking is that the relation-
ship between psychoanalysis and the rhetorical tradition never seemed of much 
interest either to Freud himself, who appears to have studiously avoided mention 
of the topic, or to scholars of classical antiquity, who have preferred to devote 
the principal part of their attention to psychoanalysis’s therapeutic retrieval of 
ancient myth and tragedy.³ 
In one sense, this situation is understandable. Parallels between psycho-
analytic therapy and ancient tragedy are as numerous as they are diverse, from 
the importance placed on dialogue and katharsis to the necessity of formal con-
straints on space and time. These affinities explain why Freud, particularly in the 
early stage of his career, nourished such an abiding interest in the writings of the 
tragic poets. And yet, resemblances between the analyst and the rhetor are just as 
prominent: both are committed theorists, teachers, and practitioners of the logos; 
both are concerned with pathos, or affect, and its relationship to the spoken utter-
ance; both emphasise the plasticity of character (ethos) in achieving persuasive 
results. The question, then, remains: why, given the force of such affinities, did 
1 Jones (1953) 375. 
2 “SE”, henceforth in the text, refers to Freud (1953–74).
3 For a concise history of the latter, see Bowlby (2009). Rhetoric, the technē par excellence for 
inhabitants of the supremely verbal polis, is mostly absent from more recent studies of Freud and 
classical antiquity (e.g., Armstrong (2005); Oliensis (2009)), though Le Rider (2002) provides 
important examples of the place of rhetoric in Freud’s gymnasium curriculum.
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Freud circumvent classical rhetoric with such an impressive degree of insouci-
ance? To attribute this lacuna to personal disposition alone is to evade the many 
wider-reaching questions it raises, chief among which are the role of language in 
the “analytic situation”⁴ and Freud’s complex relationship to the latter vis-à-vis 
the scientific ambitions of psychoanalysis. 
As George Makari has shown, Freud’s theory of the mind was rooted in the 
new aspirational sciences of the nineteenth century (biological Darwinism, psy-
chophysics, neuroanatomy), tempered as it was by typical Victorian frustrations 
regarding the limitations of scientific capability. As a consequence, Freud never 
relinquished his desire  “to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science” 
(SE, I, 295), as he phrases it in his incomplete 1895 manuscript, “Project for a 
Scientific Psychology”. He merely replaced the anatomizing vocation of his early 
career with the spatialized, psychical models of psychoanalysis, what he called 
“structures” or “topographies”. These fictive models were only ever intended as 
an expedient if temporary step on the road to eventual scientific legitimacy since 
;the deficiencies in our description would probably vanish if we were already in 
a position to replace the psychological terms by physiological or chemical ones” 
(SE, XVIII, 60). Nonetheless, Freud’s decision to abandon a research career in 
neurology and train as a physician was a momentous one, for it very quickly 
led him to the aetiology of hysteria, the logic of dreams, and the universality of 
the Oedipus complex. The direct necessity of treating patients untreatable by 
existing methods led Freud not only to the “speculative” models he so vaunts in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle but also to the experimental bricolage by which he 
sharpened his therapeutic technique. This early search for a method led Freud 
to methods as distinctive, and controversial, as hypnosis and cocaine, before he 
stumbled on two techniques which became the cornerstone of analytic therapy 
for the remainder of his life: the interpretation of the patient’s free associations 
and the manipulation of the patient’s transference. 
This discovery was, of course, also a rediscovery. But while the scientific, 
philosophical, and literary roots of Freud’s breakthrough have been well docu-
mented, psychoanalysis inheritance of the rhetorical tradition has been subject 
to less scrutiny, perhaps partly due to Freud’s own indifference to the subject. I 
will try and show here how the principle technical innovations of psychoanalytic 
therapy – free association and the transference – both draw on a long Western 
tradition of reflection on the persuasive power of language  (logos), character 
4 Freud’s indifference to rhetoric may stem from an excessively restricted view of rhetorical “con-
text”, i.e. limiting it to judicial or political situations of urgency. What Freud calls the “analytic 
situation” nonetheless fulfils each of Bitzer’s three criteria for a “rhetorical situation” (1968) 6.
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(ethos), and emotional appeal (pathos). Free association and the transference 
reproduce the two key modes of rhetoric as technē: rhetoric as persuasion and 
rhetoric as interpretative tool. With respect to the latter, the necessity of a rhe-
torical approach to the interpretation of the unconscious is required because the 
unconscious employs a wealth of rhetorical displacements (e.g., ellipsis: omis-
sion of a key term; metonymy: part for whole; periphrasis: talking around) in 
order to slip past what Freud calls psychical “censorship” (SE, XXII, 15) and into 
conscious life. The unconscious metaphorises its message through the symptom, 
requiring an analyst well-versed in the distinction between tenor and vehicle: “as 
soon as writing, which entails a liquid flow out of a tube on to a piece of white 
paper, assumes the significance of copulation, or as soon as walking becomes 
a symbolic substitute for treading upon the body of mother earth, both writing 
and walking are stopped because they represent the performance of a forbidden 
sexual act” (SE, XX, 90). But the analyst must also employ rhetorical persuasion 
as a means of galvanising the progress of the treatment. The analyst’s handling of 
the transference clearly draws on the old rhetorical proofs of pathos (the arousal 
or abreaction of the patient’s affective responses) and ethos (the analyst’s “mir-
roring” of a particularly important character in the patient’s life). 
Although psychoanalysis draws on the resources of the rhetorical tradition, 
it is by no means reducible to a simple process of persuasion.⁵ For, to use a dis-
tinction that has long played a role in rhetorical theory, if psychoanalysis seeks 
to persuade, it must also convince.⁶ By influencing the transference, the analyst 
can persuade and thereby alter the structure of the patient’s unconscious. For 
the analysis to achieve any measure of success, however, the patient must be 
consciously convinced that they grasped the truth of their condition. Such con-
viction can only be brought about by the dialectical process of analysis, that is, 
by rational argumentation. Only reasoned argument can appeal to the logical 
domains of consciousness and the preconscious, while, conversely, only the 
analyst’s rhetorical technique can appeal to and thus persuade the non-logical 
domain of the unconscious.
Psychoanalytic therapy also relies on a third type of discourse, however: the 
discourse of science. Psychoanalysis has always depended on scientific princi-
ples which, irrespective of their number or their relative mutability, play a deter-
mined and determining role in structuring the dialectical-rhetorical encounter. 
5 To claim that psychoanalytic therapy is sustained by “rhetorical analysis” alone (Van den 
Zwaal (1988)) is to miss both the dynamic dialectic of the analytic encounter and the scientific 
principles which supposedly underpin it. 
6 See Perelman (1991) 26–31. 
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This does not mean that these discursive modes (scientific, dialectical, rhetorical) 
are always in harmony with each other. In Freud’s case, there is a clear desire 
to understate the rhetorical mode and accentuate the scientific credentials of 
analysis, for reasons which are no doubt historically strategic. A key argument 
of the current article, however, is that the specificity of psychoanalytic therapy 
lies not in its prioritising of any single mode but in its attempt to offer a coherent 
synthesis of all three. Recent controversies surrounding the burgeoning field of 
“neuro-psychoanalysis”⁷ remind us that such synthesis has always been contro-
versial, and that the relations between each mode have always been unequal, 
dynamic, and evolving.
II
To investigate psychoanalysis” integration of these three discursive modes, it is 
useful to return to a thinker whose work already provides such a model. Through-
out his writings, but principally in the Rhetoric and the Topics, Aristotle stresses 
the complementary nature of dialectical, rhetorical, and scientific (i.e. demon-
strative) proofs.⁸ This complementarity can be stated succinctly: scientific knowl-
edge (epistēmē) is produced when syllogistic demonstration (apodeixis) is made 
from certain necessary principles (archai).⁹ When the premises are not necessary, 
but disputed or merely probable opinions (endoxa), what is required is dialectical 
syllogistic (the subject of Aristotle’s Topics) or, in certain contexts, the rhetorical 
enthymeme (the subject of the Rhetoric). 
We have already seen how Freud aspired towards a psychoanalysis founded 
on the model of the natural sciences (SE, XXII, 187–8), but that precise empiri-
cal knowledge of the electro-chemical mechanisms underpinning psychical life 
frustrated such ambitions. To fend off accusations of “suggestion”, Freud bor-
rowed a number of principles from biology and physics, where deductions from 
fundamental axioms had already produced an impressive and broadening body 
of knowledge (epistēmē).¹⁰ Inspired by Gustav Fechner, for instance, what Freud 
called the “principle of constancy” referred to the psychical apparatus’s tendency 
to keep the internal quantity of excitation as low or as constant as possible, thus 
7 See, paradigmatically, Solms/Turnbull (2011); Malabou (2012). 
8 See, for example, Rhetoric 1 1, 1355a4–18 (references are to the Barnes edition unless stated 
otherwise). 
9 Posterior Analytics 1 6, 74b5–12.
10 On Freud’s borrowing from contemporary sciences, see Sulloway (1979); Makari (2008). 
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explaining the mechanism of repression and the partial discharge of drive energy 
in the “symptom”. But while physicists could test the validity of their principles 
through the observation of moving bodies, limitations in neurobiology meant 
that Freud’s Konstanzprinzip could be tested only indirectly, through the dialec-
tical exchange of analyst and analysand and what it revealed about the relative 
intensity of the patient’s drives.
The dialectic interaction of analysis played a pivotal in testing the founda-
tional axioms of psychoanalytic therapy. Unlike Socratic dialectic, Aristotle’s dia-
lectic does not aim at the timeless truth of a universal Form but serves a critical 
role in scrutinising the foundations of “the philosophical sciences”.¹¹ At its most 
concrete, Aristotle’s dialectic involves an “exchange between participants acting 
in some way as opponents”.¹² In a dialectical debate, the “answerer” typically 
poses a thesis or proposition which the “questioner” tries to refute by bringing 
out a latent contradiction in the premises. In the analytic situation, dialectic 
is useful for the same reason it is in Aristotle: it allows the questioner to test a 
proposition put forward by the patient without having knowledge of the truth 
or falsity of the premise in question. In this way, analysis aims, as dialectic does 
in Aristotle, at “securing premises”¹³ since it only by means of the latter that the 
patient’s conviction can be attained and the cure effected. 
The road to conviction is not, however, straightforward. Following interpre-
tation of the patient’s free associations, the analyst confronts him or her with a 
thesis (what Freud calls a “construction”) concerning the structure of the patient’s 
unconscious. As these constructions are accepted or rejected by the patient, con-
sciously or unconsciously, they are progressively refined by the analyst until a 
“recollection” emerges and the analysand has reached a state of conviction. This, 
at least, is the basic structure outlined by Freud in his final paper on technique, 
“Constructions in Analysis” (1937). Here Freud repeatedly emphasises the dialec-
tical nature of analysis: it “involves two people, to each of whom a distinct task 
is assigned” (SE, XXIII, 258). He aims to refute the commonly held view that psy-
choanalysis is a dogmatic mode of interpretation, that it is founded on a sophis-
tical logic of “Heads I win, tails you lose” (SE, XXIII, 257). In other words, if the 
patient agrees with the analyst’s interpretation, the interpretation is correct; if he 
or she rejects it, this is a sign of his or her resistance to it. In rejecting this view, 
Freud argues that progress in the treatment is only ever achieved through equal 
11 Topics 1 2, 101a25–27. For a detailed treatment of the relationship between dialectic and sci-
entific demonstration, see Evans (1977). 
12 Smith (1999) 58. 
13 Smith (1999) 60.
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exchange between patient and analyst. “We do not pretend,” he writes, “that an 
individual construction is anything more than a conjecture which awaits exami-
nation, confirmation or rejection” (SE, XXIII, 265). 
While an “interpretation” concerns a fragment of distorted material (a 
symptom or dream-image, for example), an analyst’s “construction” is a consist-
ent argument drawing on a number of interpretations which providing a picture 
of the patient’s unconscious (SE, XXIII, 261). The dialectical structure of analysis 
proceeds, ideally, as follows: “the analyst finishes a piece of construction and 
communicates it to the subject of the analysis so that it may work upon him; he 
then constructs a further piece out of the fresh material [including, crucially, the 
patient’s openness or hostility to the original construction] pouring in upon him, 
deals with it in the same way and proceeds in this alternating fashion until the 
end” (SE, XXIII, 260–1). In this way, the patient’s responses – which may or may 
not be “resistances”, which may or may not be conscious – feed back into the 
reciprocal spiral of meaning-making that is the analytic situation. The danger of 
the unjustified “imposition” of a construction is guarded against by the very dia-
lecticity of this process. In the case of a false construction, the patient’s reaction 
will be tepid and no fresh material will follow, allowing the analyst to discern 
whether he or she was on the right path or has somehow gone astray. The alter-
nating structure of falsehood and truth is thus actively dialecticized (or, in Hege-
lian language, “sublated”) by the hermeneutic rules of analytic technique (SE, 
XXIII, 162). This movement continues until the analyst attains a “construction”, 
i.e. an internally consistent picture of the patient “forgotten years”, that is both 
“trustworthy” and “in all essential respects complete”.
The subtlety of Freud’s phrasing here (“in all essential respects”) takes us to 
the core of the distinction between Socratic and Aristotelean types dialectic. In 
Plato’s dialogues, most famously the Meno, Socratic questioning seeks to bring 
forth a forgotten truth that is both eternal and external, on the model of the truths 
of geometry. In the dialectical encounter of analysis, however, what is in question 
is not a necessary timeless truth but a truth which is internal and historical. If 
Socratic dialectic terminates in the intuition of an ideal Form, the psychoanalytic 
dialectic is undertaken in a spirit of provisionality or, to use Freud’s own lan-
guage, “interminability”.¹⁴ For Aristotle, dialectic is not a positive science but a 
method of negative critique which is always in some sense incomplete, or rather, 
to-be-completed. For Freud, similarly, the very notion of a “complete” construc-
tion is, like the Borgesian map which completely covers the territory it purports to 
14 SE, XXIII, 209–53. Freud himself rejects the “approximation” of psychoanalytic therapy and 
the Socratic method (SE, XVI, 280). 
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represent, a theoretical fiction. Every construction “is an incomplete one, since it 
covers only a small fragment of the forgotten events” (SE, XXIII, 263). In psycho-
analysis, this structural incompleteness takes several forms – the uninterpreta-
ble “navel” of the dream (SE, V, 525), the retroactive revision of the meaning of 
the past (Nachträglichkeit),¹⁵ the late conclusion that analysis is always to some 
extent “interminable” – but in each case it refers to a structural axiom with which 
analytic therapy must contend. The therapeutic consequences of this are con-
siderable, for if every construction is incomplete, then the “cure” cannot be trig-
gered by a complete correspondence of the construction (the reasoned argument 
concerning the structure of the patient’s unconscious) with the historical truth of 
what has been repressed. 
From where, then, does the analytic cure arise? Several clues are provided 
in the closing pages of Freud’s paper. If the patient’s reactions to a construction 
are “rarely unambiguous”, then “only the further course of the analysis enables 
us to decide whether our constructions are serviceable or unserviceable”. This 
language of functionality points again to the fact that a construction need not 
present a complete picture of a state of affairs in order to be “serviceable”, i.e. 
effective in bringing about a cure. What is important, we are told, is that the ana-
lyst’s “conjecture” is eventually replaced by the patient’s “conviction” (SE, XXIII, 
265). If there is congruence between the two, this does not always entail a “rec-
ollection” on the patient’s part of the repressed material. Indeed, it is sometimes 
the case that “an assured conviction of the truth of the construction achieves 
the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory” (SE, XXIII, 266). This con-
cession is particularly striking because it suggests that the real aim of analytic 
therapy is not the Platonic anamnesis of recollection per se, but the patient’s rea-
soned conviction that what he or she has grasped is the truth of their illness. In 
both cases, i.e. cure by recollection and cure by belief in the construction, the 
common element is not the reawakening of a memory; it is the patient’s “convic-
tion” of having grasped a truth that has emerged through the dialectical process 
of analysis. 
This emphasis on convincing/conviction, however, brings psychoanalytic 
therapy into dangerous alignment with rhetorical persuasion. Freud indeed 
acknowledges the “danger of our leading a patient astray by suggesting, by per-
suading him to accept things which we ourselves believe but which he ought not 
to” (SE, XXIII, 262). But here, as in Plato and Aristotle, the dangerous incursion of 
sophistic rhetoric  (“Heads I win, tails you lose”) calls for the scrupulous observa-
tion of technique: only correct adherence to the dialectical method of analysis can 
15 See Laplanche/Pontalis (1988) 11–114. 
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guard against unjustified persuasive suggestion (SE, XXIII, 263). It is my conten-
tion, however, following Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen’s forceful account of the return of 
“suggestion” in Freud’s later work,¹⁶ that the type of rhetorical (i.e., non-rational) 
persuasion that Freud seeks in this passage to expel from psychoanalytic treat-
ment is in fact a fundamental component of analytic treatment. This is because, 
as Freud was all too aware, however dynamic the dialectical exchange between 
analyst and analysand, every analysis eventually encounters an impasse: the 
patient’s “resistance” to the cure (SE, XVI, 286–302). Since rational constructions 
alone cannot induce the patient to give up these resistances, the analyst must 
adopt classical techniques of persuasion in order to dynamize a treatment that 
will otherwise founder in inertia.¹⁷ 
The necessity of adopting different approaches – one based on rational argu-
ment (dialectic), the other on rhetorical persuasion – is explained by Freud’s 
topographical distinction between the logical domains of consciousness (percep-
tion, thought) and the preconscious (stored memories and experiences), and the 
essentially non-logical domain of the unconscious (repressed wishes, traumas, 
and libidinal urges).¹⁸ Reasoned argument is insufficient to bring about the cure; 
it must be supplemented by personal influence, that is, the analyst’s handling of 
the patient’s transference-resistance through the arousal of emotions by means 
of an appropriate presentation of the analyst’s character. In other words, only the 
proofs of pathos and ethos can bring about conditions in which the analysand 
will engage openly with the analyst’s reasoned constructions (logos). 
It is striking that Freud, who so vaunts the systematising potential of psy-
choanalytic theory, seems unaware that the power of both the words and charac-
ter of the speaker to engage the emotions was already the subject of systematic 
investigation in antiquity. Indeed, several of Freud’s technical recommendations 
regarding conscious and unconscious influence are the subject of commentary in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. An example of this rich crossover can be found by compar-
ing Aristotle’s text with a short technical paper by Freud, “Wild Psychoanalysis” 
16 Borch-Jacobsen (1990). 
17 Freud distinguishes between conscious and unconscious resistance. The former is “an intel-
lectual resistance”, in that “it fights by means of argument” (SE, XVI, 289); the latter, “the id’s 
resistance”, is more recalcitrant but nonetheless more susceptible to rhetorical persuasion. For a 
detailed discussion of this distinction, see SE, XX, 224–5. 
18 The unconscious’s transgression of logical categories is exemplified in the absurdity of the 
dreamscape: “dreams are disconnected, they accept the most violent contradictions without the 
least objection, they admit impossibilities […]. Anyone who when he was awake behaved in the 
sort of way that is shown in situations in dreams would be considered insane” (SE, IV, 54, see 
also SE, V, 543).
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(SE, XI, 221–7). In this paper, Freud discusses the dangers of treatment practiced 
by those insufficiently versed in the theory and technique of psychoanalysis. 
He recounts the case of a newly divorced woman who was advised by her physi-
cian – on the basis of a minimal familiarity with psychoanalytic therapy – that 
her anxiety was caused by lack of sexual satisfaction. Since her religious back-
ground obliged her to reject his prescribed course of treatment (remarrying her 
husband or taking a new lover), her anxiety worsened. As the woman remained 
unconvinced by the physician’s “construction”, he referred her case to a person-
ality (ethos) of some authority in the field of psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud – 
not to treat her condition but merely to confirm the doctor’s original hypothesis. 
On the one hand, the physician’s lack of success stems from an ignorance of 
the dialectical method of analysis: he attempts to impose his conjectured con-
struction on the patient without applying the appropriate dialectical techniques 
of interpretation. But he also misunderstands the rhetorical dimension of anal-
ysis, believing that Freud’s reputation alone will suffice to persuade the patient 
to accept the initial construction. These difficulties are only compounded by his 
ignorance of the scientific principles underpinning the dialectical and rhetori-
cal techniques of analysis, in this case the principle of constancy: the idea that 
“blocked” internal excitation can be abreacted through simple sexual satisfac-
tion is a gross mischaracterization of analytic theory.
Given the woman’s obvious “hostile feelings” towards him, Freud is most 
critical of the physician’s innocence of the transference (SE, XI, 221), which 
means that he is essentially powerless against the patient’s resistances. For 
Freud, the latter can only be overcome by bypassing the patient’s conscious 
resistances (which will eventually become susceptible rational argument) and 
by altering those resistances which remain unconscious (and are thus suscep-
tible only to rhetorical persuasion). The only “means of persuasion” available to 
the analyst is the manipulation of the positive or negative affective charges of 
the patient’s transference. It is not the case, as the physician believed, that the 
authority or reputation of a particular analyst is decisive in analytic treatment; 
rather it is the analyst’s ability to reflect, unobtrusively, the character or ethos of 
a figure of personal importance to the patient which enables the resolution of the 
 transference-resistance. For Aristotle, if rhetoric is to function as a technē appro-
priate to a maximal variety of situations, the confidence the speaker inspires must 
“be due to the speech itself, not to any reestablished reputation by the speak-
er”.¹⁹ If ethos as proof were based on the speaker’s actual character or personality, 
the inflexibility of the latter would in fact inhibit, in the majority of cases, the 
19 Rhetoric, 1356a9–10. On this point, see Brunschwig, 46. 
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 persuasive power of the orator. It would hamper the orator’s ability to influence 
the audience’s emotional responses (pathos) since appeals to affect are often built 
on the orator’s ethos. The analyst influences the patient’s affective responses by 
presenting him- or herself as a “blank slate” on which the patient can project a 
pre-existing (most often, but not always, parental) model. Like the ideal orator 
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, who attunes his self-presentation to the character (ethos) 
or characters (ethoi) of a given audience,²⁰ Freud argues that “the doctor should 
be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what 
is shown to him” (SE, XII, 118).²¹ Only later, once the patient has “formed a suffi-
cient attachment (transference) to the physician for his emotional relationship to 
him to make a fresh flight impossible” (SE, XI, 226), should the analyst offer the 
patient a reasoned account of the workings of his or her unconscious. 
III
In his classic text on analytic technique, “Variations on the Standard Treatment” 
(1953), Jacques Lacan ridiculous those analysts who use the “stylish” notion 
of counter-transference (the analyst’s affective investment in the patient) as a 
means of shirking “the action that it is incumbent upon him to take in the pro-
duction of truth” (2006: 276). While Freud’s mirror metaphor suggests an ideal of 
non-intervention on the part of the analyst, Lacan insists that the analyst must 
play an active role in all parts of the analytic treatment. Indeed, the very idea that 
the analyst enjoys a kind of splendid isolation is a fiction, since even the analyst’s 
“silence implies (comporte) speech” (2006: 291). 
What type of speech is Lacan referring to here? His text makes a sharp dis-
tinction between the truth of discourse (discours) and the truth of speech (parole), 
the former referring to language’s  “correspondence to the thing” (2006: 291) and 
thus with scientific “knowledge of reality”, the latter referring to the truth of 
the unconscious articulated in and through the patient’s speech. Despite their 
fundamental incommensurability, each mode of truth – discours and parole – is 
“altered when it crosses the path of the other truth” and therefore each plays 
complementary roles in the subject’s experience of the world. The precise nature 
20 Aristotle (2006) 148–56. For Grimaldi “[the aim of Aristotle”s] study of the major character 
types is to show the speaker how his ethos must attend and adjust to the ethos of varied types of 
auditor if he is to address them successfully” (1998, 2: 186). 
21 In this way, in Mahony’s elegant formulation, “the analyst does not so much persuade as 
effect a persuasion” (1974) 417.
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of this complementarity is developed in a second distinction made by Lacan: 
between convincing (con-vaincre) and persuading (per-suader).²² 
For Lacan, “discourse (discours) proceeds to con-vince, a word that involves 
in the process of reaching an agreement” (2006: 292). Discourse refers to the 
agreement of two or more interlocutors concerning a given state of affairs, i.e. the 
“correspondence” between a verbal picture and the reality it represents. It is anal-
ogous to Aristotle’s notion of dialectic in so far as the agreement concerns a par-
ticular construction of reality (or thesis). At the same time, reaching agreement 
on a particular construction of reality (discours) is hampered by the continual 
interruption of the truth of the unconscious (parole): “this process [of convinc-
ing] is carried out while the subject manifests bad faith, steering his discourse 
between trickery, ambiguity, and error. But this struggle to assure so precarious a 
peace would not offer itself as the most common field of intersubjectivity if man 
were not already completely per-suaded by speech”. In this passage, Lacan, like 
Freud, holds the unconscious to be the organ of persuasion and the ego that of 
conviction, even if his somewhat negative (poststructuralist) assessment of the 
latter marks a clear divergence from Freud (“the subject loses himself in the dis-
course of conviction, due to the narcissistic mirages that dominate his ego’s rela-
tion to the other”). 
On the other hand, as in Freud, it is because the subject is “completed per-
suaded by speech” that the analyst must draw on the rich resources of the rhe-
torical tradition: “we can see, in the most unexpected manner, in the elabora-
tion of the unconscious’s most original phenomena – dreams and symptoms 
– the very figures of outdated rhetoric, which prove in practice to provide the 
most subtle specifications of those phenomena” (2006: 299). Such compari-
sons between unconscious phenomena and rhetorical figures and tropes were 
a common intellectual topos in the postwar period, originating in the work of 
Roman Jakobson but perhaps most authoritatively articulated in Lacan’s “lin-
guistic” unconscious.²³ Unlike many of his contemporaries, however, who pre-
served an essential distinction between psychoanalysis and rhetoric through the 
figure of analogy, for Lacan the unconscious is not “like” rhetoric: it is rhetoric. 
And if the psychoanalyst is not “like” a rhetor, it is because the psychoanalyst “is 
22 The role of this distinction in Lacan may be traceable to his engagement with contemporary 
theorists of rhetoric such as Chaïm Perelman, to whose work Lacan responds in “Metaphor of 
the Subject” (2006) 755–8. For Perelman, “the term persuasive [applies] to argumentation that 
only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term convincing to argumentation that 
presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being” (1969) 28–9.
23 Jakobson (1956); Todorov (1982); Benveniste (1971). 
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a rhetor (rhéteur), […] he  rhetifies (rhétifie), which implies that he rectifies”.²⁴ The 
rectification that the patient seeks in analysis, then, is intrinsically linked to the 
analyst’s status as a rhetor, a word we must take not only in its traditional sense – 
as teacher of persuasion through the study of tropes – but also in the sense of a 
committed practitioner of persuasion, as orator. 
Existing scholarship on Lacan’s use of rhetoric has examined the impor-
tance of tropes and the textbooks of Cicero and Quintilian in understanding 
the rhetorical turns of the patient’s speech (parole).²⁵ Lacan, for instance, 
famously identifies the mechanisms of unconscious defence with the figures 
of classical rhetoric:
This is why an exhaustion of the defense mechanisms […] turns out to be the other side 
of unconscious mechanisms […]. Periphrasis, hyperbaton, ellipsis, suspension, anticipa-
tion, retraction, negation, digression, and irony, these are the figures of style (Quintilian’s 
figurae sententiarum), just as catachresis, litotes, autonomasia, and hypotyposis are the 
tropes, whose names strike me as the most appropriate ones with which to label these 
mechanisms. Can one see here mere manners of speaking, when it is the figures them-
selves that are at work in the rhetoric of the discourse the analysand actually utters?” 
(Lacan 2006: 433).
Part of the role of the analyst-rhetor is to interpret such mechanisms rhetorically. 
The role of the analyst is never simply one of interpretation, however; he or she 
must also induce or persuade the patient to reflect on the latent meaning of such 
“turns” of speech and to give up the resistances which motivate it. My focus here 
will be on precisely this dimension of the analytic equation: the means by which 
the analyst intervenes actively and rhetorically in the progress of the cure. While 
Lacan’s relationship to classical rhetoric may not be all-determining, it clearly 
goes beyond the mechanical application of rhetorical reading to the distorting 
ruses of the patient’s unconscious (free association). To paraphrase Marx, the 
goal of psychoanalysis is not simply to interpret the unconscious, the point is 
also to change it. In examining how the analyst sets about to alter the structure 
of the analysand’s unconscious, I will draw on a much underexploited corpus of 
texts: the written testimony of Lacan’s own patients. More specifically, I will make 
24 Lacan (1977) 7.
25 Chaitin (1996); Mahony (1974); Fink (2004) 72–5. This reading is summed up by Mahony 
(425): “in resisting free association or “pure” referential discourse, the patient thereby tries to in-
fluence, convince the analyst. The analysand’s resistances are rhetorical, being greatly involved 
in maintaining his superego or ethos before his auditor”. For contemporary rhetorical studies” 
embrace of Lacan, see Lundberg (2012). 
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reference to George Haddad’s detailed account of his analysis with Lacan, though 
a wealth of competing material is also available.²⁶
What the detailed examination of such texts reveals is that, for Lacan at 
least, the analyst’s handling of the transference functions at both the concrete, 
micro-logical level of trope (Lacan deploys irony to intensify the transference and 
thereby dynamize the cure) and at the larger macro-logical level of persuasion 
(Lacan employs the rhetorical proofs of pathos and ethos to induce the patient to 
give up his or her resistances). In this way, the analytic situation offers an organic 
synthesis of two dimensions of rhetoric that are sometimes seen to be in conflict: 
rhetoric as the study of tropes and rhetoric as persuasion.
One of the most significant yet controversial ways in which the Lacan-
ian analyst intervenes in the session is through the technique of “scanding” 
(scanner). Scanding refers to the analyst’s attempt to structure the patient’s free 
associations by means of “punctuation” or “interruption”. In free associative 
speech, we have seen, the analysand employs of a series of “spontaneous” rhe-
torical figures to keep him or her from confronting certain unconscious ideas. 
The role of the analyst is not only to interpret such speech (and formulate a more 
or less likely “construction”); it is also to persuade the patient to reflect on its 
latent meaning and, eventually, to abandon the resistances which underpin it. In 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, this is achieved through “scanding” the patient’s asso-
ciations, a technique that can be as simple as a well-timed exclamation (“Huh!”) 
or the repetition of a phrase that the patient has just uttered.²⁷ The most extreme, 
and contentious, method of punctuating the session in this manner is to termi-
nate it without warning, a technical innovation of Lacan that is sometimes called 
the “short session”.
Scanding in fact falls into a very technical rhetorical category: paralipsis, a 
subset of irony which consists in “drawing attention to something in the very act 
of pretending to pass it over”.²⁸ In Haddad’s account of his treatment, for example, 
he recalls Lacan’s punctuation of his free association with a series of inscruta-
ble sniggers (ricanement) or seemingly indifferent sighs: “once my statement 
had described a closed loop, Lacan interrupted me, leaving in the statement’s 
hollow a mysterious significance”.²⁹ At face value such dismissals underline the 
26 See Roudinesco (1999) 504, n.7 for a (now somewhat dated) bibliography of such testimony; 
more recently, Gérard Miller (2012) has filmed a series of documentary-interviews with Lacan’s 
former patients. 
27 Fink (1999) 15. 
28 http://rhetoric.byu.edu.
29 Haddad (2002) 102 (all translations my own).
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 insignificance of what has just been said, but in the charged meaning-laden sit-
uation of analysis they can have the opposite, paraliptic effect. The power of this 
technique lies in the fact that it is not immediately determinable if such dismissals 
do in fact signify their opposite, that is to say, whether such speech acts have a 
literal value  (“what you have just said has no bearing on your analysis”) or a met-
aphorical one (“what you have just said is rich with unconscious significance”). 
The problem of irony, and perhaps the very source of effectiveness as trope, has 
always been one of uncertainty: how can we know if our interlocutor is being 
sincere or not? This uncertainty tends to be written out of heavily formalized rhet-
oric manuals, though its efficacy has resurfaced in recent decades in a postmodern 
turn from the constative aspect of irony (this is what I really meant) to its performa-
tive, persuasive function (this is what my proposition does: inspire questioning).³⁰ 
In the analytic situation, the analyst’s irony is an open-ended problem, one which 
constantly stimulates the patient to question the truth of his or her repressions. As 
Lacan puts it in an early seminar, irony is “far from being an aggressive reaction, 
irony is primarily a means of questioning, a mode of question. If it has an aggres-
sive element, it is structurally secondary in relation to the question element”.³¹ 
This reference to aggression raises a second and no less important dimension of 
irony: its relationship to affect. For Hutcheon, “there is an affective “charge” to 
irony that cannot be ignored and that cannot be separated from its politics of use 
if it is to account for the range of emotional response (from anger to delight) and 
the various degrees of motivation and proximity (from distanced detachment to 
passionate engagement)”.³² Irony may indeed signal the withdrawal of affect, but 
it also engages emotion in a powerful way through the recursive self-questioning it 
throws back on the audience. This dimension is a crucial element of Socrates” use 
of eironeia. Plato’s Socrates deploys irony to biting rhetorical effect in his cease-
less questioning of the citizens of Athens, deliberately blurring the boundaries 
between his own ignorance and knowledge in a way which frequently arouses the 
hostility or anger of his interlocutors. In a cognate way, the psychoanalyst feigns 
ignorance (through the punctuation of a “huh” or the repetition of a phrase) in 
order to arouse the analysand’s positive or negative emotions and ultimately 
encourage reflection on the sources of resistance. 
As a trope, however, irony never occurs in isolation but is always deployed 
within the context of a larger process of persuasion. While it can stimulate the 
interlocutor to self-reflection, it also plays a wider role in the patient’s  experience 
30 For Linda Hutcheon, this uncertainty is the very source of “irony’s edge” (1994) 11.
31 Lacan (1994). 
32 Hutcheon (1994) 15.
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of the transference. Haddad’s account is useful here because it shows, at a con-
crete technical level, how Lacan’s use of scanding aims at stimulating a crisis 
of pathos that will eventually lead to the working-through of the neurosis. The 
title of Haddad’s narrative, The Day Lacan Adopted Me, is an (ironic?) allusion 
to the highly transferential nature of what would become a nine-year analysis 
with Lacan. By projecting his tense relationship with his father onto his relation-
ship with Lacan, Haddad is able to accept the futility of his craving for paternal 
approval and become, against the wishes of his biological father but with those 
of his “adopted” father, an analyst in his own right. Haddad’s memoir is as an 
immensely rich source of insight into the practical dynamics of the transference, 
but I can only comment briefly here on how Lacan makes use of scanding to influ-
ence Haddad’s transferential pathos and eventually effect a cure.
The book’s narrative clarifies the degree to which Lacan’s therapeutic prac-
tice was predicated on the plasticity of the analyst’s self-presentation (ethos). 
Where Freud cautioned analysts to practice “abstinence” or “privation” (SE, XVII, 
162) in relating to patients, to act as an impassive “receptive organ” or “telephone 
receiver” for the discourse of their analysands (SE, XII, 115), Lacan’s technical 
procedure consisted in direct intercession between the patient and his or her 
unconscious affective state. Haddad’s text thus portrays an analyst who “did not 
hesitate to offer a paternal gesture in taking the hand of his patient, often on the 
verge of tears, speaking to him or her with words of affection, “mon petit, ma bien 
chère””. Such techniques aim at intensifying the transference through the use 
of gestures, verbal and non-verbal, which appeal to the patient’s unconscious 
projections: 
He reacted to some of my remarks […] with sighs full of anxiety and emotion, 
with handshakes which were some days more insistent than others. While accom-
panying me in a friendly manner to the door of his consulting room, or while 
opening the corridor window over the courtyard I had to pass through when 
leaving the “clinic”, he would shout “See you tomorrow! See you tomorrow!” as 
if I was somehow in danger of forgetting our next meeting. I felt this agitation, 
whose sincerity I never doubted, like the spur of a horseman pushing me beyond 
my limits of possibility [..]. In this way an entire series of small satisfactions or 
privations, so important to the intense transference relationship he encouraged, 
came to dynamize the cure.³³ 
It is only when Lacan intensifies the frequency and shortness of their sessions, 
however, that a crisis is provoked which enables Haddad to grasp the meaning 
of his analysis. Confronting Lacan over his apparent callousness,  Haddad’s 
33 Haddad (2002) 100. 
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aetiological epiphany is described in the following terms: “it was precisely this 
question of the father, of his hoped for yet unbearable death, which formed the 
hard bone of my relationship to Lacan, of my quasi-delirious transference”.³⁴ My 
argument here, and indeed throughout this article, has been that Haddad’s real-
ization, based as it is on his reasoned conviction regarding a given construction, 
could not have occurred without the transference relationship, i.e. without the 
analyst’s use of rhetorical persuasion to appeal indirectly to unconscious affec-
tive charges. If psychoanalysis is by no means reducible to such techne rhetorike, 
it cannot entirely do without them either. 
A final question: if Lacan has done more than any other theorist to reacquaint 
psychoanalysis with its rhetorical roots, how can we explain his later devotion 
to the matheme, the diagrammatic representation of the structure of the uncon-
scious which seems to run so counter to the contingencies of rhetorical persua-
sion? The point of the latter is that it represents not content as such, but rather 
the purity of a timeless “structure” – what Freud would call a “principle” – from 
which the theoretical and technical practice of psychoanalysis can proceed. 
Lacan, like Freud, bases the dialectical structure of the analytic situation on sci-
entific principles (archai), such as the structures of linguistics or geometry or set 
theory. But scientific principles alone, as Freud himself concedes, are incapable 
of leading to a cure. If knowledge of the structure of the unconscious were enough 
to rid the patient of a particular pathology, then, as Freud notes, “listening to lec-
tures or reading books would be enough to cure him” (SE, XI, 225), just as staring 
at, or wrangling meaning from, one of Lacan’s mathemes will not in and of itself 
effect a cure. Scientific principles alone are not enough to ensure the success of 
the treatment. The power of psychoanalysis lies in its integration of dialectical 
and rhetorical modes which, while they can never be entirely assimilated to sci-
entific principles, are continually informed and shaped by them. 
34 Haddad (2002) 166.
